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HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTESTING THE DISPLACEMENT THESIS 
 
Paul O’Connell* 
 
 
‘You don’t roll some unitary boulder of language or justice uphill; you try 
with others to assist in cutting and laying many stones’.† 
 
 
ABSTRACT: From within the camp of broadly left wing or progressive critiques of 
human rights, one of the key objections that has emerged is what we can refer to 
as the displacement thesis. In sum, this critique maintains that reliance on the 
language of human rights by movements for radical social change is problematic, 
because it tends to crowd out (or displace) other, potentially emancipatory, 
languages, and as a consequence distract attention from broader, structural causes 
of injustice and oppression. It is argued here that while this argument is intuitively 
appealing, it falls short for a variety of reasons. There are, to be sure, many 
problems with human rights, but the mobilisation of rights language can 
nonetheless make an important contribution to movements for radical social 
change, without displacing or precluding the mobilisation of other emancipatory 
languages, and the challenging of deeper, structural causes of injustice. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: human rights - displacement thesis - critique - struggle - emancipatory 
politics  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s Louis Henkin confidentially declared that human rights were ‘the idea 
of our time … the only political-moral idea that has won universal acceptance’.1 Much 
water has passed under the bridge since then, with myriad challenges to and critiques of 
human rights developing from various points along the political and ideological 
spectrum.2  Notwithstanding this, human rights remain a central concern in our age.3 As 
Balfour and Cadava put it, human rights are now ‘one of the most pressing and 
                                                 
* Reader in Law, SOAS University of London. I would like to thank Daniel Attenborough, Dimitrios 
Kivotidis, Lutz Oette, Nimer Sultany, Jen Wilkinson and an anonymous reviewer for comments on earlier 
drafts of this article. As ever, responsibility for any remaining shortcomings is mine alone.  
† Adrienne Rich, Arts of the Possible (W.W. Norton & Co. 2001) 6. 
1 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press 1990) ix. 
2 For summaries of the main critiques of human rights see: Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, ‘Critiques’ in 
Moeckli, Shah and Sivakumaran (eds.), International Human Right Law (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 53 and 
Frédéric Mégret, ‘Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18 
Vignettes’ in Beneyto and Kennedy (eds.), New Approaches to International Law (Springer 2012) 3. 
3  As Amartya Sen puts it, the ‘rhetoric of human rights is omnipresent in the contemporary world’. 
Amartya Sen. ‘The Global Reach of Human Rights’ (2012) 29 Journal of Applied Philosophy 91, 91. 
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2 
intractable matters of political life’.4 On this intractable terrain, one of the key critiques of 
human rights, usually voiced from the left/progressive side of the debate, is the 
apprehension that the language of human rights tends to undermine movements for 
radical social change by tempering their ambitions and limiting their horizons to a 
narrow set of legal demands, eliding broader causes of injustice and foreclosing other 
emancipatory languages: this, in essence, is what might usefully refer to as the 
displacement thesis.  
 
The displacement thesis raises important, and pressing, questions about the nature of 
human rights, and the value, or otherwise, of social movements engaging and mobilising 
the language of human rights. These are not mere abstract considerations, of concern 
only to closed systems of recondite academic exchange. Rather, they are pressing and 
important issues. Because all around the world, at a critical historical juncture,5 social 
movements are articulating their opposition to the extant social order, often through the 
language of human rights. This has seen mass movements mobilise behind demands for 
the right to housing in Spain and South Africa,6 land in Brazil,7 racial equality and protest 
in the United States, 8  water in Ireland, 9  and the right to the city in Turkey and 
elsewhere,10 to name but a few. If, then, the displacement thesis holds, and the language 
of human rights invariably undermines social movements by narrowing their 
emancipatory horizons, this is a strong argument for jettisoning the language of human 
rights in these movements and elsewhere. 
                                                 
4 Ian Balfour and Eduardo Cadava, ‘The Claims of Human Rights: An Introduction’ (2004) 103 South 
Atlantic Quarterly 277, 277. 
5 The stakes of the current historical period—characterised by the general crisis of capitalism—are brought 
into sharp relief by Immanuel Wallerstein, who argues that: ‘We may think of this period of systemic crisis 
as an arena of struggle for the successor system … We are faced with alternative choices which cannot be 
spelled out in institutional detail, but may be suggested in broad outline. We can choose collectively a new 
system that essentially resembles the present one: hierarchical, exploitative and polarizing … Alternatively 
we can choose a radically different system, one that has never previously existed—a system that is relatively 
democratic and relatively egalitarian’. Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Structural Crises' (2010) 62 New Left Review 
133, 140-141. 
6 On South Africa see: Jackie Dugard, Tshepo Madlingozi and Kate Tissington, ‘Rights Compromised or 
Rights Savvy? The Use of Rights-Based Strategies to Advance Socio-Economic Struggles By Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, the South African Shack-Dwellers Movement’ in Garcia, Klare and Williams (eds.), Social 
and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice (Routledge 2015) 23; and on Spain see: Ada Colau and Adrià 
Alemany, Mortgaged Lives: From the Housing Bubble to the Right to Housing (The Journal of Aesthetics & Protest 
2014). 
7 Peter Houzager, ‘The Movement of the Landless (MST), Juridical Field, and Legal Change in Brazil’ in 
Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalization From Below (CUP 2005) 218.  
8 Fredrick Harris, ‘The Next Civil Rights Movement?’ (2015) 63(3) Dissent 34. 
9 Daniel Finn, ‘Water Wars in Ireland’ (2015) 95 New Left Review 49.   
10 Mehmet Baris Kuymulu, ‘Reclaiming the Right to the City: Reflections on the Urban Uprisings in 
Turkey’ (2013) 17(3) City 274 and David Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’ (2008) 53 New Left Review 23. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published in Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly by Queen’s University Belfast: 
https://nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq/issue/archive  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24877/  
 
3 
 
The argument presented here is that the displacement thesis does not hold, and that 
movements for radical social change can and do engage the language of human rights 
without necessarily limiting the emancipatory imagination or ambition of those involved 
in such movements. The argument unfolds as follows: first I outline the contours of the 
displacement thesis, drawing in particular on the work of Wendy Brown to illustrate the 
main thrust of the argument; secondly it is argued that this thesis relies on a truncated, 
abstract understanding of human rights, and the relationship between rights and social 
change; the third section argues that the practice(s) of social movements show that it is 
possible for movements to engage the language of human rights without losing sight of 
the broader, structural causes of injustice they confront; the final section then ties the 
argument together, noting the positive role that human rights can play in movements for 
fundamental social change. It should be stressed that the argument presented here is by 
no means a blanket defence of, or apologia for, human rights, nor indeed is it an argument 
for the necessity of rights language in movements for radical social change. It is, far more 
modestly, an argument that one apparently radical and intuitively appealing critique of 
human rights does not quite hold, and that, notwithstanding the many problems with the 
language of human rights, social movements can—and in some circumstances should—
mobilise this language as part of broad movements for social change. 
 
II. THE DISPLACEMENT THESIS 
Human rights have, of course, long since come in for criticism: from Jeremy Bentham’s 
dismissal of rights as nonsense on stilts,11 to Karl Marx’s radical critique of the limitations 
of bourgeois rights under capitalism.12 Throughout the late twentieth century, as the 
language of rights came to play a more prominent role, critiques of rights became more 
pronounced. In particular the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement launched a variety 
of scathing critique of “rights talk” and practice,13 with particular emphasis on the US 
constitutional tradition.14 Within this milieu various rights critiques emerged, some of the 
                                                 
11  Jeremy Bentham, ‘Nonsense Upon Stilts’ in Schofield, Pease-Watkin and Blamires (eds.), Rights, 
Representation and Reform: Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution (OUP 2002) 317.  
12 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd Edn, W.W. Norton & 
Co. 1978) 26.  
13 For useful overviews of the CLS movement see: Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement (Verso 2015); and Alan Hunt, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1. 
14 Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies’ in Brown and Halley (eds.), Left 
Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press 2002) 178. 
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4 
main claims being that right and rights talk tended: (i) to insulate and valorise 
subordination in the private sphere, (ii) to legitimate, perpetuate and conceal greater 
injustice than they addressed and (iii) that the language of rights tended to be atomistic 
and to alienate people from one another.15 
 
For present purposes, it is a variation on the second of these arguments that is of most 
interest. The basic idea is captured well by Morton Horowitz, who wrote that  
 
the vindication of rights is set in an exclusively legal and individual 
specific framework, drawing energy and imagination away from structural 
change. Indeed, framing issues of social justice in terms of individual 
rights has the additional effect of denying equal legitimacy to claims that 
the overall social distribution of wealth and power is unjust.16  
 
In other words, mobilising the language of human rights tends to distract us from 
broader, structural causes of injustice, and to undermine, or displace, other languages or 
ways of seeing,17 that might better allow us to get to the root causes of injustice and 
denial of human rights. By framing matters in this way, Horowitz captures the essence of 
the displacement thesis. 
 
More recently, a fuller account of this argument has been advanced by Wendy Brown. In 
a well-known essay, in which she convincingly dispatches Michael Ignatieff’s liberal 
defence of human rights,18 Brown registers a number of concerns that arise from ‘human 
rights assuming centre stage as … the international justice project’. 19  While Brown 
rehearses a number of well-established critiques of human rights, the central aspect of 
her argument, for present purposes, is the concern that  
 
Human rights activism is a moral-political project and if it displaces, 
competes with, refuses, or rejects other political projects, including those 
                                                 
15 See Robin West, ‘Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama’ (2011) 53 William and Mary 
Law Review 713, 716; and Anthony Chase, ‘The Left on Rights: An Introduction’ (1984) 62 Texas Law 
Review 1541. 
16 Morton Horwitz, ‘Rights’ (1988) 23 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 393, 400. 
17 In this way, the argument chimes with a concern among critical commentators that ‘reliance on rights in 
political struggles and by political movements invites a kind of legal imperialism, in which courts and 
lawyers take on an unhealthy prominence’. Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns, ‘Editorial Introduction’ in 
Sarat and Kearns (eds.), Identities, Politics and Rights (University of Michigan Press 1997) 1, 4-5. 
18 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press 2001). 
19 Wendy Brown, ‘“The Most We Can Hope For …”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism’ (2004) 
103 South Atlantic Quarterly 451, 453 [original emphasis]. 
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5 
also aimed at producing justice, then it is not merely a tactic but a 
particular form of political power carrying a particular image of justice, 
and it will behoove us to inspect, evaluate and judge it as such.20 
 
Brown goes on to argue that in light of the renewed vigour of US imperialism and the 
suffering it occasions, perhaps instead of human rights, support for anti-imperialist 
struggles and indigenous movements in post-colonial societies, or other narratives, would 
be more efficacious in resisting the depredations of the global imperial order.21  
 
Having argued that mobilising the language of human rights tends to crowd out other, 
possibly more efficacious frameworks (or, in Brown’s terms, justice projects), Brown 
then calls on us to recognise ‘the difficulty of trying to engage in both kinds of projects 
simultaneously’.22 In other words, if we mobilise human rights, we will most likely have 
jettisoned alternative languages and perspectives on the injustice we oppose. Brown 
concludes by arguing that human rights discourse ‘is a politics and it organizes political 
space, often with the aim of monopolizing it. It also stands as a critique of dissonant 
political projects, converges neatly with the requisites of liberal imperialism and global 
free trade, and legitimates both as well’.23 In place of this, Brown argues that we should 
broaden our horizons and instead foreground ‘other kinds of political projects, including 
other international justice projects’ which directly address the structural character of 
global capitalism and hyper imperialism. The argument, in sum, is that the language of 
human rights cannot ‘articulate or address the conditions producing’ violations of human 
rights,24 and even more problematically, mobilising the language of human rights tends to 
distract us from the broader, structural causes of suffering and injustice. 
 
Variations on this argument have been articulated by numerous critical scholars, David 
Kennedy, for example, argues that even ‘very broad social movements’ will tend to ‘have 
their vision blinkered by the promise of recognition in the vocabulary and institutional 
apparatus of human rights’, and as such ‘will be led away from the economy and toward 
the state, away from political/social conditions and toward the forms of legal 
                                                 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid 460. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid 461. 
24 Wendy Brown, ‘Suffering Rights as Paradoxes’ (2000) 7 Constellations 230, 239. 
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6 
recognition’.25 Likewise Robin West warns that reliance upon the language of human 
rights will ‘distract our critical gaze, thereby legitimating larger injustices’. 26 In a similar 
vein Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas argue that ‘human rights stop us talking about 
bigger questions, those of power, justice and poverty’.27 Each of these statements is a 
different way of articulating the same, general, displacement thesis put forth by Brown. If 
the thrust of the displacement thesis was confined to the practices of mainstream human 
rights organisations, and formal, liberal legalism, then, in certain key respects, it would be 
a valuable and incontrovertible addition to how we think about and critically engage with 
human rights. If the target was simply the ‘global human rights industry’, 28  and 
mainstream scholarship, there would be little to contest in the displacement thesis.  
 
But, it goes far beyond this. The various articulations of the displacement thesis are 
framed in imperative terms, the issue is not liberal legalism or mainstream human rights 
discourse, but human rights as such. As Gearty and Douzinas put it above, human rights 
as such, stop us seeing the bigger issues of power, justice and poverty. Likewise, Brown 
concludes her piece—from which the key lines of the displacement thesis have been 
sketched above—by arguing that according centrality to human rights reflects a high 
degree of pessimism and fatalism on behalf of ‘progressives’, in general, and urging that 
if ‘others have not yet arrived at this degree of fatalism, then we would do well to take 
the measure of whether and how the centrality of human rights discourse might render 
… other political possibilities more faint’. 29  In sum, the displacement thesis is one 
specific strand of a more generalised critique and dismissal of human rights.30 In the next 
section, it will be argued that while, as a critique of liberal legalism, the displacement 
thesis is appealing, it is fundamentally unsustainable as a broader critique of human rights 
as such.   
 
III. CONTESTING THE DISPLACEMENT THESIS 
                                                 
25 David Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem’ (2002) 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 101, 110. 
26 West (n 15) 721. 
27  Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas, ‘Introduction’ in Gearty and Douzinas (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Human Rights Law (CUP 2012) 1, 14. 
28 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009) 19. 
29 Brown (n 19) 462. 
30 Slavoj Zizek, ‘Against Human Rights’ (2005) 34 New Left Review 115; and Jarret Zigon, ‘Human Rights as 
Moral Progress? A Critique’ (2013) 28 Cultural Anthropology 716. 
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7 
The virtue of the displacement thesis is that it points up some of the key shortcomings 
of mainstream human rights practice and discourse. Certainly, there are sufficient 
historical examples, drawn in particular from the US constitutional tradition, to 
demonstrate how an over-reliance—perhaps a naive faith—in the language of rights has 
facilitated the co-optation of social movements, and to fundamental structures of 
oppression being left unchecked.31 The problem with the displacement thesis, is that it 
moves from this useful insight, to an overbroad claim about the nature of human rights 
as such. Two of the important reasons for this leap from correct premises to incorrect 
conclusions are that: (i) the displacement thesis, articulated by scholars within a critical-
liberal tradition, gives too much autonomy to language and ideas (in particular the 
dominant rendering of ideas); and (ii) pays far too little attention to the actual practices 
of social movements and human agency in articulating human rights claims. This section 
unpacks both of these issues, which, taken together, constitute key theoretical and 
methodological shortcoming of the displacement thesis and other strands of left-liberal 
critique of human right, namely the privileging of language and ideas abstracted from 
concrete social conditions and struggles.  
 
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels argued that ‘neither thoughts nor language in 
themselves form a realm of their own … they are only manifestations of actual life’,32 in 
contrast to this insight, an implicit premise of the displacement thesis is that the 
discourse of human rights operates with a logic of its own. Human rights appear to have 
the power to distract our gaze, to stop us from seeing bigger issues of power, and to 
displace other, emancipatory languages and perspectives. In this way, proponents of the 
displacement thesis become preoccupied with contesting ideas abstracted from concrete 
struggles and lose sight of the fact that ‘categories of thought are expressions of the 
social relations that underlie them’.33 The displacement thesis takes as is object of critique 
the idea of human rights, rather than the concrete relationships that underlie any given 
struggle over human rights. 
 
Even more problematically, those who articulate the displacement thesis take for granted 
the dominant rendering of human rights (liberal-legalist) and uncritically make it the 
                                                 
31 West (n 15); and Gavin Anderson, Constitutional Rights After Globalisation (Hart 2005) 79-99. 
32  Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘The German Ideology’ in Marx-Engels Collected Works: Volume 5 
(Lawrence & Wishart 2010) 447. 
33 John Holloway, ‘Crisis and Critique’ (2012) 36(3) Capital & Class 515, 516. 
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8 
subject of their critique. This reflects a broader trend in various strands of late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century critique, as John Holloway, writing about some variants of 
Marxist critique, notes  
 
What we see first … is the dominant moment of the antagonistic unity. 
And something awful happens. Our critique degenerates into a theory of 
domination. Marxism becomes a theory of capitalist domination. 
Reactionary claptrap, in other words - a theory that encloses us in the 
enclosure that it pretends to criticise. A theory of Cassandra, a theory that 
separates the analysis of capitalism from the movement of struggle.34 
 
The positive aspect of the displacement thesis, recognition of the inherent limits of 
liberal-legalist rights talk, is undermined by the fact that it remains myopically focused on 
this dominant rendering of human rights. The overemphasis on how human rights are 
and have been used to sustain and legitimate the status quo, morphs into a deterministic 
understanding of the nature of human rights as such. Because the focus is on how the 
great and the good engage with human rights, all that can be seen is the negative aspect 
of human rights. A failure to understand human rights as grounded in antagonistic social 
struggles and, as such, reflecting such antagonisms, results in a one-sided, negative 
understanding of human rights, and leads, readily, to their dismissal.  
 
This privileging of ideas/language abstracted from concrete social struggles and 
relationships also leads to the idea, central to the displacement thesis, that there are other 
languages or perspectives for comprehending and challenging injustice that avoid the 
pitfalls of human rights. But this contention is simply not borne out: one need only look 
at how in recent years neoliberalism weaponised the emancipatory concept of individual 
freedom/liberty,35 or how late capitalism appropriates, as it hollows out, the idea of 
democracy,36 to understand that in a system of global capitalism, there is no language or 
discourse that is not, in some way, compromised, or undermined by the social 
reproductive processes of the extant order. 37  As Prabhat Patnaik argues, just as 
democracy and equality are impoverished under capitalism, so too are human rights, but 
                                                 
34 ibid.  
35 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2007). 
36 Peter Mair, Ruling the Void (Verso 2013); and Samir Amin, The Liberal Virus (Pluto Press 2004). 
37 Thinking otherwise is to engage in what Hunt refers to as ‘a form of “Leftism” whose inescapable error 
lies in the fact that it imagines a terrain of struggle in which social movements can, by an act of will, step 
outside the terrain on which [social] struggle is constituted’. Alan Hunt, ‘Rights and Social Movements: 
Counter-Hegemonic Strategies’ (1990) 17 Journal of Law and Society 309, 320.  
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9 
this is no reason to abandon any of these emancipatory languages.38 There is no pure, 
silver bullet argument or perspective that allows us to engage and confront the injustices 
of the existing capitalist order,39 once this is grasped, then the generalised critique and 
rejection of human rights grounded on the displacement thesis loses much of its lustre.  
 
Another important reason why proponents of the displacement thesis reach their 
generalised conclusions is because their analyses tend to neglect, or undervalue, the role 
of social struggles in articulating and contesting formulations of human rights. While 
Douzinas, who with Gearty espouses a version of the displacement thesis, has elsewhere 
acknowledged that human rights ‘started their lives as the principle of liberation from 
oppression and domination, the rallying cry of the homeless and the dispossessed, the 
political program of revolutionaries and dissidents’,40 he, along with others, abandons the 
perspective of social struggle in thinking about human rights today. Much like the 
triumphant bourgeois thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they seem to 
declare that there has been history, but there is no more. This stance, however, is 
fundamentally mistaken. For while the global human rights industry (of lawyers, 
international organisations, NGOs, academics and more) certainly provides us with a 
dominant discourse of human rights, the history and contemporary relevance of human 
rights are unintelligible without foregrounding the role of social struggle.   
 
This point is made by Neil Stammers, who argues that ‘ordinary people—working 
together in social movement—have always been the key originating source of human 
rights’.41 While not claiming that social movements and struggles are the only factors of 
                                                 
38 As Patnaik puts it: ‘just as “democracy” in a bourgeois society serves to camouflage exploitation, just as 
“equality” in a bourgeois society is only the equality of commodity-owners in the marketplace, underlying 
which is the reality of exploitation, likewise “rights” in a bourgeois society are meant only to sustain a 
structure of exploitation. But this does not make “rights” meaningless, no more than it makes 
“democracy” or “equality” meaningless. On the contrary, just as “democracy” and “equality” can get 
realised only in a society transcending capitalism, i.e., in a socialist society, likewise “rights” too become 
meaningful only in a socialist society, which is why the left must struggle over ‘rights” in a bourgeois 
society, as it struggles over “democracy” and “equality”’. Prabhat Patnaik, ‘A Left Approach to 
Development’ (2010) 45 (30) Economic & Political Weekly 33, 36-37. 
39 In this regard Martha McCluskey is right to warn that ‘left activists’ who strive for political purity ‘are 
likely to end up divided, exhausted, and immobilised’. Martha McCluskey, ‘Thinking With Wolves: Left 
Legal Theory After the Right's Rise’ (2006) 54 Buffalo Law Review 1191, 1200. 
40 Costas Douzinas, ‘The End(s) of Human Rights’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 445, 445. 
41 Stammers (n 28) 1. In a similar way, William Armaline and his colleagues argue that ‘human rights have 
been and continue to be defined and realised primarily through bottom-up power struggles and social 
movements’. William Armaline, Davita Silfen Glasberg and Bandana Purkayastha, The Human Rights 
Enterprise (Polity Press 2015) 115. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published in Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly by Queen’s University Belfast: 
https://nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq/issue/archive  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24877/  
 
10 
concern in the study of human rights, Stammers insists that ‘the historical emergence and 
development of human rights needs to be understood and analysed in the context of 
social movement struggles against extant relations and structures of power’.42 Stammers 
notes that, in due course, the institutionalisation of human rights, in one form or 
another, necessarily generates a set of contradictions about how rights are encountered 
and engaged.43 However, he is critical of accounts of human rights that are ‘fixated upon 
existing institutional and legal frameworks’ and ignore the ‘social processes’ that led to 
the establishment of such frameworks and shape their continued contestation.44 He is 
also critical of human rights critiques and critics that overemphasise the autonomy of 
discourse, warning that they can signal ‘a return to forms of … structural determinism 
and the elimination of the possibility of social actors being able to engage in any form of 
meaningful agency’.45  
 
To avoid committing either of these errors, we should instead foreground the concrete 
struggles of groups, communities and movements in advancing and articulating human 
rights claims, as part of broader movements for radical social change. In place of a 
myopic focus on dominant structures, or the implicit quietism of discourse critique, our 
understanding of and engagement with human rights should be one which begins from 
an understanding that ‘the history of human rights can and should be seen as a history of 
social struggle over very real matters of power, resources, and political voice’.46 Groups 
and movements engaged in concrete struggles over power, resources and contested 
relationships do not, as the displacement thesis implies, engage in a sort of emancipatory 
monolingualism. Instead, they routinely frame their claims for justice, equality, and social 
transformation in a range of dialects. If it were otherwise, then the partisans of the 
French Revolution would have confined themselves to inscribing on their banners 
Freedom, Justice, or Equality, not all three.  
 
Of particular importance, for present purposes, is the fact that in an era of crisis ridden 
neoliberal capitalism, social movements all around the world are framing their opposition 
to the extant order and their embryonic visions of an alternative, in large part, through 
                                                 
42 Stammers (n 28) 2. 
43 ibid 102-130. 
44 ibid 22. 
45 ibid 17. 
46 Armaline, Glasberg and Purkayastha (n 41) 4.  
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the language of human rights. As Armaline and his colleagues note, human rights 
struggles ‘are increasingly shaped by and targeted toward systems of privilege and 
oppression and their social and ecological effects — neoliberal economic globalization 
(capitalism) in particular’.47 In the next section we will look at concrete instances of 
contemporary social struggles that mobilise the language of human rights, alongside 
broader narratives about justice, democracy and social transformation, to illustrate how 
an alternative starting point in thinking about human rights can lead us to very different 
conclusions to those sketched out by proponents of the displacement thesis. 
 
IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
At its best, the displacement thesis recalls Audre Lorde’s cutting insight that the ‘master’s 
tools will never dismantle the master’s house’.48 Where it falls short, however, is in failing 
to appreciate that a ‘different future has to be the future of this particular present. And 
most of the present is made up of the past. We have nothing with which to fashion a 
future other than the few, inadequate tools we have inherited from history’.49 In this 
section the focus is on how two contemporary social movements have mobilised the 
language of human rights to challenge specific injustices, but have done so in a way that 
brings in other languages and perspectives that broaden their struggles out into a more 
thorough critique of the extant social order. While accepting completely that two 
swallows do not make a spring, these examples show that social movements can and do 
mobilise the language of human rights in a way which remains attentive to broader 
structural causes of injustice. It also shows that social movements routinely engage in a 
sort of emancipatory or critical multilingualism, which mobilises democracy, equality, 
race, gender and class alongside human rights claims. In this way protagonists in social 
movements routinely understand, as Audre Lorde did, that they cannot ‘afford the luxury 
of fighting one form of oppression only’.50 The two cases we look at are the struggle for 
housing carried on by Focus E15 in London, and the struggle against domestic water 
charges in Ireland.  
 
1. Focus E15 and the Right to Housing  
                                                 
47 ibid 10.  
48 Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Ten Speed Press 2013) 112. 
49 Terry Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right (Yale University Press 2011) 71. 
50 Audre Lord, ‘There is No Hierarchy of Oppressions’ (1983) 14 Bulletin: Homophobia and Education 9. 
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One of the more pronounced crises in the UK today is the lack of affordable or adequate 
housing for large sections of the population. This crisis has its origins in shifts, from the 
1980s onwards, towards privatisation of the social housing stock, 51  the model of 
financialised accumulation characteristic of the last three decades of neoliberalism,52 and 
more recently the impact of austerity on social welfare provision. 53  All of this has 
combined to make the housing issue, one of the central concerns in modern Britain. For 
a variety of reasons, this general crisis takes on a more acute character in London. As 
Michael Edwards has argued, London experiences ‘extreme forms’ of the general 
problems associated with the housing crisis (social housing waiting lists, rising rents and 
house prices, insecure tenancies, overcrowding, declining quality of properties), 54  but 
precisely because of this London is also the site of many noteworthy, albeit ‘embryonic 
and fragmented’, movements of resistance in response to the housing crisis.55 
 
One of these movements of resistance is Focus E15, which was formed in September 
2013 by a group of young, working class mothers, to oppose their eviction from a local 
Council run supported housing unit in Newham, East London. 56  Using a variety of 
tactics, from weekly street stalls, to petitions, occupations, and marches, the Focus E15 
campaigners successfully resisted their eviction and ‘then went onto campaign for the 
housing and urban rights of ordinary Londoners’.57 The Focus E15 campaign frames its 
campaign around the emblematic slogan of ‘social housing not social cleansing’ and 
understand it as being a ‘battle for everybody’s basic human rights and equality’.58 In 
particular, and unsurprisingly, the campaign sees their struggle as part of a broader ‘fight 
for the right to decent, affordable, secure housing’.59 The language of human rights, in 
particular the right to housing, is therefore central to the Focus E15 campaign. 
 
                                                 
51 Mary Robertson, ‘The Great British Housing Crisis’ (2017) 41 Capital & Class 195, 196. 
52 Michael Edwards, ‘The Housing Crisis and London’ (2016) 20 City 222. 
53 Steve Tombs, ‘Undoing Social Protection’ in Cooper and Whyte (eds.), The Violence of Austerity (Pluto 
2017) 133. 
54 Just Fair, Protecting the Right to Housing in England: A Context of Crisis (Just Fair 2015). 
55 Edwards (n 52) 222. 
56 Paul Watt, ‘A Nomadic War Machine in the Metropolis: En/countering London’s 21st Century Housing 
Crisis With Focus E15’ (2016) 20 City 297; and Focus E15 ‘3 Years of Resistance: How We Did It’ 23 
September 2016 available at: < https://focuse15.org/2016/09/23/3-years-of-resistance-how-we-did-it/>.  
57 Watt (n 56) 298. 
58  Focus E15, ‘Statement By Jasmine and Sam, Focus E15 Campaign’ 15 October 2014 available at: 
<https://focuse15.org/2014/10/15/statement-by-jasmin-and-sam-focus-e15-campaign/>.  
59 Focus E15, ‘The Housing Bill, Civil Disobedience and the Mothers of Argentina’ 18 January 2016 
available at: <https://focuse15.org/2016/01/18/the-housing-bill-civil-disobedience-and-the-mothers-of-
argentina/>.   
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However, alongside this, and as a matter of course, the Focus E15 campaigners mobilise 
the language of class, gender, and race, and situate their campaign, explicitly, in the 
broader context of neoliberal capitalism and opposition to the logic of commodification 
inherent in that system of social reproduction. As one of the campaigners put it  
 
The way I see it, it seems like London is turning into a place that is just 
for purely rich people and investors, bankers, they are all coming into 
London … and all working-class people are being pushed out, and like 
eventually it’s going to turn into like we will be living in the slums, we will 
be living in houses that are falling apart, that they are not getting anything 
done to them, because we are the poor people, we are the poor side, they 
are the rich side.60 
 
The Focus E15 campaigners consistently and clearly articulate their struggle for the right 
to housing, as part of a broader dynamics of working class opposition to the 
depredations of neoliberal capitalism. Most of them having been newly politicised by 
their initial campaign to prevent their eviction, now understand that the local council had 
underestimated ‘the strength of working class mothers coming together and demanding 
their right to safe and decent housing in London’.61 
 
The multiple, overlapping languages mobilised by Focus E15 includes human rights but 
also mobilises ‘class, place, gender … motherhood … generation and race’. 62  One 
manifestation of this is that when the campaign successfully obtained some funding to 
support organisational/office space, they promptly declared their new premises ‘Sylvia’s 
Corner’ in homage to the ‘militant suffragette and socialist’ Sylvia Pankhurst, who had 
been active in East London in the early twentieth century. The campaigners chose this 
name for their premises to ‘directly [link] the current struggles led by todays  militant 
women to the inspiring revolutionary struggles of the past’. 63 As well as understanding 
their campaign for the right to housing as being embedded in relations of class, gender 
and race, the campaign connects their struggle with international campaigns for the right 
to housing, and understand the current crisis in housing as a consequence of the extant 
system of social reproduction, neoliberal capitalism. As the group put it in a recent 
                                                 
60 Quoted in Watt (n 56) 302. 
61 Focus E15 (n 56). 
62 Watt (n 56) 316. 
63 Focus E15, ‘Militant Suffragette Sylvia Pankhurst Inspires Housing Campaigners’ 02 June 2016 available 
at: <https://focuse15.org/2016/06/02/militant-suffragette-sylvia-pankhurst-inspires-housing-
campaigners/>.  
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published in Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly by Queen’s University Belfast: 
https://nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq/issue/archive  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24877/  
 
14 
statement, the ‘whole of Europe is in the grip of a capitalist crisis, a neo-liberal disaster 
and we must ensure that we continue to fight for our human right to have decent 
homes’.64 In the same statement, the Focus E15 campaigners explicitly articulate their 
struggle for the right to housing as being against the financialised, commodified system 
of housing provision. 
 
The Focus E15 campaign is one of a number of groups working to challenge the acute 
housing crisis in London, and while it is a relatively small group, it is one of the more 
inspirational and integral elements of the broader movement for decent housing in 
London today. What the above survey of their activities and the ways in which they 
articulate their analysis and claims shows, is that social movements engaged in concrete 
struggles can and do mobilise the language of human rights, without necessarily losing 
sight of the broader causes of the injustices they oppose. As Watt notes, the Focus E15 
campaign has ‘demonstrated an unerring capacity to discursively crystallise the political 
economic and social contradictions underpinning London’s housing crisis’.65 One way in 
which they have crystallised their response to this crisis is through demands for the 
human right to housing. But, crucially, this has not been done through an appeal to 
liberal-legalist notions of human rights. Rather, it has seen the language of the right to 
housing mobilised in a way which situates it at the intersection of class, race and gender 
and is attentive to the structural causes of the housing crisis which the campaigners 
confront.66  
 
2. Ireland and the Right2Water 
Throughout the world, the last twenty years have seen a series of intense, sometimes 
protracted, struggles over access to water. These struggles have emerged and been fought 
out in the context of a period of neoliberal hegemony, and the consequent 
                                                 
64 Focus E15, ‘The Privatisation of Housing Means Misery for European Working Class’ 07 June 2017 
available at: < https://focuse15.org/2017/07/07/the-privatisation-of-housing-means-misery-for-
european-working-class/>.  
 
65 Watt (n 56) 316. 
66 This is an instance in which claiming the right to housing represents ‘a demand for profound social 
change, giving communities power to alter patterns of ownership and provides housing as a right rather 
than a commodity’. Joe Hoover, ‘The Human Rights to Housing and Community Empowerment: Home 
Occupation, Eviction Defence and Community Land Trusts’ (2015) 36 Third World Quarterly 1092, 1095. 
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commodification and financialisation of this most basic of human needs.67 One such 
struggle has unfolded in Ireland since 2014, where successive centre-right governments 
have sought to introduce individualised metering and domestic water charges, against 
which a mass movement has arisen asserting the right to water.68 The Irish ‘water war’, as 
some have dubbed it, erupted after a six year period of austerity budgets, which saw cuts 
to public spending, social welfare, the downgrading of public services and rising taxes for 
low and middle income households. All of which led to one third of the Irish population 
living in deprivation, the highest net emigration figures in the OECD and the decimation 
of living standards for individuals and working-class communities.69 In large part this 
austerity was imposed in the context of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed 
between the Irish state and the Troika (EU, IMF and ECB), which has seen Ireland pay 
back a disproportionate share of the Eurozone banking crisis.70 One of the elements of 
this MoU was that Ireland would establish a new water utility, and introduce water 
charges.  
 
In late 2013 the then government set up a semi-state body, Irish Water, and began the 
process of installing water meters in residential properties. Almost immediately this 
policy ran into opposition, with local communities, particularly in working class areas in 
Dublin and Cork, mobilising to prevent the installation of water meters. The 
bourgeoning opposition to the charges led to the establishment of a national campaign 
group in 2014, Right2Water, made up of community groups, trade unionists and broadly 
left wing political parties. Right2Water, as the name implies, was ‘established as a broad-
based campaign with one key belief and one key objective – that water is a human right 
and that water charges should be abolished’.71 The campaign mobilised hundreds of 
thousands of people at national days of protest, while newly politicised and galvanised 
communities continued their tactics of preventing meter installation, boycotting the 
water charges, and protesting against government ministers.  
                                                 
67 Manuel Couret Branco and Pedro Damião Henriques, ‘The Political Economy of the Human Right to 
Water’ (2010) 42 Review of Radical Political Economics 142; Oriol Mirosa and Leila Harris, ‘Human Rights to 
Water: Contemporary Challenges and Contours of a Global Debate’ (2012) 44 Antipode 832; and Kate 
Bayliss, ‘The Financialization of Water’ (2014) 46 Review of Radical Political Economics 292. 
68 Finn (n 9); Rory Hearne, ‘The Irish Water War’ (2015) 7 Interface 309; and William Wall, ‘Water and Its 
(Dis)Contents’ (2015) 5 Studi irlandesi 209. 
69 Hearne (n 68) 309. 
70 Finn (n 9) 51. 
71  Right2Water, ‘Right2Water – Strategy, Tactics, Unity’ (2015) available at: 
<http://www.right2water.ie/blog/right2water-%E2%80%93-strategy-tactics-unity>.  
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All of this has combined to extract concessions from the government, and indeed the 
issue of water charges was a key factor in bringing down one government and decimating 
the Irish Labour Party, who were seen by many working class people has having betrayed 
them on the issue of water charges. While these represent definite achievements for the 
anti-water charges campaign, the issue has not yet been resolved, and it’s probable—if 
not likely—that some form of domestic water charge will be introduced in the near 
future.72 Notwithstanding this, the Right2Water movement in Ireland remains ‘one of the 
largest and broadest, and most sustained, social movements in Ireland since 
independence in 1921’.73 
 
For present purposes our concern, as with the case of the Focus E15 campaign, is with 
how the Right2Water movement in Ireland engaged the language of human rights 
alongside other frames of reference, and connected the specific rights struggle its 
protagonists were engaged in with broader causes of injustice. In this regard one of the 
striking things about the Right2Water campaign is that it was, from the outset, a 
campaign which conceived of the right to water, as a basic social good, in direct 
opposition to the logic of commodification, privatisation and austerity.74 From the outset 
the Right2Water campaign articulated its defence of the right to water alongside an 
explicit understanding that rights ‘cannot be guaranteed if they are subject to market 
forces’.75 The campaign also situated the struggle for the right to water in the context of 
the much broader political malaise of the Irish state, calling for the need to break with a 
political system founded on a ‘a profit driven orgy of greed’, in order to deliver ‘real 
change’ and ‘create a Republic which puts the great mass of the people before it’s self 
serving elites’.76 
 
These views are echoed by the grassroots community protesters who made up the 
backbone of the Right2Water campaign, as Hearn notes these protesters were ‘motivated 
                                                 
72  Right2Water, ‘The Right2Water Battle Continues and It’ll Never End’ (2017) available at: 
<http://www.right2water.ie/blog/right2water-battle-continues-and-it%E2%80%99ll-never-end>. 
73 Hearne (n 68) 312. 
74 With good cause, for as Branco and Henriques note, the ‘commodification of society … is contradictory 
with a society whose purpose is to enhance human rights’. Branco and Henriques (n 67) 154. 
75  Right2Water, ‘Water Rights and Wrongs: The European Experience’ (2014) available at: 
<http://www.right2water.ie/blog/water-rights-and-wrongs-european-experience>. 
76  Right2Water, ‘2015 – The Year We Change Ireland’ (2015) available at: 
<http://www.right2water.ie/blog/2015-year-we-change-ireland>. 
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by a range of factors’ including the ‘impacts of austerity (which was the most cited reason 
for protesting)’ and by the ‘belief that the … government have … put the interests of the 
banks, Europe, and the bondholders before the needs of the Irish people, and that … 
working, poor and middle income people have paid an unfair burden of austerity’.77 As 
one of the many protestors, or ‘water warriors’, put it ‘I want a fair society for all not just 
the rich’. 78  In this way the campaign for the right to water in Ireland, and the 
mobilisation of the language of human rights, is done as part of a broader campaign 
against austerity, neoliberalism and the perceived degradation of democracy, and 
articulated at the intersection of class, national sovereignty and economic justice.79 It is 
noteworthy that the Right2Water campaign led, in due course, to the establishment of 
the Right2Change campaign, which articulated a set or policy proposals (centred around 
ten core rights, including rights to housing, decent jobs, democratic reform, natural 
resources and others) and called on political parties at the 2016 General Election to 
commit to these policies, in exchange for support from the campaigns members.80 While 
the platform did not have the electoral impact desired, it again demonstrated how a 
social movement engaged in concrete struggles can conceive and mobilise the language 
of human rights in a way which addresses itself to broader, structural causes of injustice.  
 
Much like the Focus E15 campaigners, the Right2Water protagonists in Ireland do not 
see themselves constrained by the narrow horizon of liberal-legalism. While Ireland is a 
party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to 
water, as such, is not a formally recognised right in Ireland. This, of course, did not 
matter to the campaigners. Their demands were not for benevolent largesse, but rather 
the articulation, through the language of rights, of demands for a radically different sort 
of economic, political and social system. A central impulse of neoliberal capitalism is the 
commodification of the entire life course, 81  by insisting that certain things are too 
important to be surrendered to the market, the struggle for the right to water represents 
                                                 
77 Hearn (n 67) 317; and Rory Hearn, The Irish Water War, Austerity and the ‘Risen People’, Department of 
Geography, Maynooth University (April 2015). 
78 Quoted in Hearne (n 68) 319. 
79 Paul O’Connell, ‘Demanding the Future: The Right2Water and Another Ireland’ Critical Legal Thinking 29 
September 2014 available at: <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2014/09/29/demanding-future-
right2water-another-ireland/>. 
80 Right2Water, ‘Irish People Have a Right2Change Say Right2Water Unions As Well Over 80,000 Take 
To The Streets’ (2016) available at: <http://www.right2water.ie/blog/irish-people-have-right2change-say-
right2water-unions-well-over-80000-take-streets>.  
81 Robin Blackburn, ‘Crisis 2.0’ (2011) 72 New Left Review 33, 35. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published in Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly by Queen’s University Belfast: 
https://nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq/issue/archive  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24877/  
 
18 
an embryonic rejection of the extant social order.82 As William Wall notes, behind the 
rejection of water charges, and the assertion of the right to water, lies a general rejection 
of the ‘neoliberal state’ and ‘while the subject of water … resonates strongly with the 
protestors it is also only no more than the symbol of other disaffections, 
discontentments and dissonances’.83 For the Right2Water campaign and Focus E15 the 
language of human rights is an important shorthand, a way of giving crystallised 
expression to the specific injustice they are confronting and to the broader structures 
which produce it. Both of these movements demonstrate, clearly, that there is no 
necessary trade-off for social movements, that they can and do mobilise the language of 
human rights without displacing other critical frameworks of analysis, or becoming 
inattentive to the structural causes of the injustices they confront.  
 
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
As stated above, the object of this article is not to mount a general defence of human 
rights, even less so of the dominant, liberal rendering of human rights that holds sway in 
most institutional settings and mainstream scholarship. Much more modestly, the 
objective here has been to highlight and make explicit the terms of the displacement 
thesis, and to show that, as a generalised critique of human rights, it does not hold. With 
that done, in this final section I want to bring together some implications of this 
discussion for how social movements, and socially-engaged scholars, should engage with 
the question of human rights. In this regard, there are three important, and overlapping, 
points that need to be made: (i) the first is that human rights, as such, will not and cannot 
solve the fundamental problems and injustices that confront the vast majority of people 
in the world today; (ii) notwithstanding this, human rights can, and in some cases should, 
form part of the arsenal of movements for radical social change; (iii) and, crucially, it is 
essential to supplement the language of human rights with a broader political and 
theoretical perspective.  
 
In relation to the first point, it is beyond doubt human rights are no panacea for all social 
ills, and in and of themselves will not and cannot address the fundamental property 
                                                 
82 Patnaik, for example, argues that struggles for the recognition of socio-economic rights, such as the right 
to water, can form part ‘of a series of measures that constitute a dialectics of subversion of the logic of 
capital’. Patnaik (n 38) 35. 
83 Wall (n 68) 221. 
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question that defines the contemporary world order. 84  Put simply, the fundamental 
causes of inequality and injustice in various forms are embedded in the structural logic of 
the system of global capitalism, predicated on the concentration of property in the hands 
of a few and the consequent exploitation and impoverishment of the many – human 
rights can never transcend and fundamentally alter this state of affairs.85 As such, human 
rights can never deliver the utopia promised by liberal-legalism and therein lies the kernel 
of truth at the heart of various left-liberal critiques of human rights However, while such 
critiques move from the recognition that human rights routinely serve ‘great power 
ends’,86 to the conclusion that human rights must therefore be jettisoned,87 we do better 
to understand the necessarily contradictory nature of human rights, and what reliance on 
the language of human rights tells us about the broader, structural context.  
 
On the latter point, it is useful to recall Marx’s observations on the Young Hegelians and 
their critique of religion in the early nineteenth century. Reflecting on this debate Marx 
made the important point that the critique of religion was, in truth, a critique of the 
social conditions which call forth religion, as he put the demand ‘to give up illusions 
about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state of affairs that requires 
illusions. The criticism of religion is therefor in embryo the criticism of the vale of 
tears’.88 In other words, our focus should not be on the language (whether religion or 
human rights), but on the conditions which call forth the language. The conditions and 
context in which we engage human rights today is, as Wolfgang Streeck puts it, one of 
capitalist crisis and a ‘lasting interregnum’.89 As Gramsci long ago warned us, in such an 
interregnum ‘morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’.90 The coming to 
power of Donald Trump in the US and the emergence of various forms of authoritarian 
statism around the world,91 coupled with the prolonging of the life cycle of neoliberalism 
                                                 
84 As Robin Blackburn puts it, the ‘plight of billions can be represented as a lack of effective rights, but it is 
the ‘property question’ - the fact that the world is owned by a tiny elite of expropriators - that is 
constitutive of that plight. The slogan of rights takes us some way along the path; but it alone cannot pose 
the property question relevant to the 21st century’. Robin Blackburn, ‘Reclaiming Human Rights’ (2011) 69 
New Left Review 126, 137-138. 
85 Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’ in Tucker (ed), The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd edn, W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1978) 525, 530-531. 
86 Blackburn (n 84)  
87 Zizek (n 30) 
88 Karl Marx, ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law’ in Marx-Engels Collected Works: 
Volume 3 (Lawrence & Wishart 2010) 176.  
89 Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? (Verso 2016) 13. 
90 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II (Buttigieg ed/trans, Columbia University Press 2011) 33. 
91 Philip Alston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human Rights’ (2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 1. 
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through the mantra of austerity,92 speak to the prescience of Gramsci’s warning. In these 
circumstances, as living standards are squeezed and basic civil rights rolled back, we are 
likely to see even more social movements mobilise the language of human rights in their 
campaigns.  
 
This should neither surprise or alarm us. The mobilisation of human rights by social 
movements, as shown above, need not mean a political or strategic blind alley. What is 
important in this context is understanding clearly the strengths and limitations of human 
rights, and their necessarily contradictory nature. Human rights are not, as Brown argued 
elsewhere, paradoxical in the sense of being some puzzle of formal logic.93 Rather they 
are contradictory, in the way that all real things are.94 The potentially progressive and 
emancipatory aspect of human rights exists side by side with the conservative aspect. As 
Ed Sparer put it ‘the potential contribution of human rights … coexists with their 
negative potential’,95 and as ‘much as rights are instruments of legitimizing oppression, 
they are also affirmations of human values. As often as they are used to frustrate social 
movement, they are also among the basic tools of social movement’.96 This is the case 
not just with human rights, but with any emancipatory discourse that we might seek to 
mobilise, and it has ever been thus. As George Lichtheim notes, and without wanting to 
carry the religious metaphor too far, in earlier historical periods the language of scripture 
was mobilised to both challenge and defend the extant order.97 
 
The language of human rights, divorced from the limitations of liberal-legalism or a 
purely litigation focused strategy, can with all of its limitations and shortcomings form a 
significant ‘component of counter-hegemonic strategies’ and a ‘potentially fruitful 
                                                 
92 Bob Jessop argues that the current period involves ‘a politics of austerity, not just austerity policies … a 
politics orientated towards reorganizing the balance of forces in favor of capital’. Mikkel Flohr and 
Yannick Harrison, ‘Reading the Conjuncture: State, Austerity, and Social Movements, an Interview With 
Bob Jessop’ (2016) 28 Rethinking Marxism 306, 312 [original emphasis]. 
93 Brown (n 24). 
94 Sean Sayers, ‘The Marxist Dialectic’ (1976) 14 Radical Philosophy 9, 11-15. 
95 Ed Sparer, ‘Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique 
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 509, 519. 
96 ibid 555. 
97 ‘In a primitive community, religion is the principle source of social morality; hence religious faith can be 
invoked as the legitimation of demands for ‘justice’ - meaning equal or at least equitable treatment. This 
has frequently been done, but it has always run into the same obstacle: conservatives no less than radicals 
can cite these religious precepts … Religion has thus traditionally served to sanctify the existing state of 
affairs, while furnishing a respectable form of protest for the oppressed by legitimizing their complaints 
against inequality and injustice’. George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (Fontana 1975) 10-11. 
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approach to the prosecution of transformatory political practice’. 98  As the examples 
discussed above, and others abound, show, it can do so without displacing other 
frameworks of critique, or losing site of the structural causes of injustice. However, it is 
even more likely that both activism and scholarship on human rights will develop along 
these lines if it is grounded in a theoretical perspective which understands the structural 
character of the extant system, foregrounds the active role of people in transforming 
their circumstances, and brings a nuanced understanding to the contradictory nature of 
rights, social struggles and more. Marxism provides such a framework, 99  as David 
Fasenfest recently argued ‘Marxism provides the language of and mechanisms for 
resistance to neoliberal agendas that strip human rights, and promotes common cause 
with all who struggle for human rights’.100 This is just one possibility, but unlike liberal 
accounts of human rights, those which draw on the resources of the Marxist tradition are 
unlikely to succumb to the siren call of liberal-legalism, or lose sight of the structural 
causes that result in the denial of human rights.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Only time will tell how movements will engage the language of human rights in the years 
to come, but what is clear from the above discussion is that they can mobilise this 
language without displacing other critical frames of reference or losing sight of the power 
relations and structural causes that undermine human rights. It is also clear from the 
above discussion that some contemporary social movements are—albeit in contradictory 
and uneven ways—reaching conclusions that fundamentally challenge the existing system 
of social relations. The positing of certain human needs, housing, water etc., as rights 
that should not be subject to the logic of the market, is a denial of the basic impulse of 
capital accumulation.  In this way, the language of human rights is mobilised in a manner 
which calls into question, whether implicitly or explicitly, the bigger issues of power, 
poverty, inequality and so on, that human rights are supposed to blind us to. As such, the 
displacement thesis looks singularly unconvincing.  
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99 As Jacques Bidet notes, Marxism provides us with ‘interpretive perspectives’ for comprehending the 
totality of the changing world we inhabit, and for that reason can be ‘mobilised wherever social and 
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With all of that said, Upendra Baxi is correct when he argues that it remains ‘important 
to stress that while human rights languages provide a striking arena for questioning the 
barbarity of power and domination, these at the same moment do not exhaust the range 
of normative politics’.101 Social movements can and do mobilise the language of human 
rights as a crystallised shorthand for their complex, often partially articulated, opposition 
to prevailing social conditions. But it is the broader context that is crucial in all of this. It 
is never human rights that are determinative in the success or failure of a given social 
movement,102 but the broader, structural context. Situating our understanding of human 
rights within a theoretical framework that explains the nature of the social order we 
struggle in and against will be crucial in allowing us to both understand and change it. 
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